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WHAT CONSTITUTES A VOTING RESIDENCE IN
PENNSYLVANIA?
Ordinarily it is not difficult to determine the meaning of
a constitutional provision, if well settled legal principles are
kept steadily in view; and the one set forth in the title, which
seems to have greatly troubled the bar and the public in
recent years, is no exception to this rule. As the purpose of
interpretation is to find what the makers of a writing meant
by the words they used in it, and as language at best is but
.an imperfect vehicle for the conveyance of thought, it is of
-supreme importance that the interpreter, so far as may be,
should put himself in the place of the makers, to the end
that, seeing with their eyes and understanding with their
minds, he may ascertain their intention with reasonable
-certainty. From this fundamental principle the following
applicable rules of interpretation have arisen: (i) The
language used in a constitution is not to receive a technical
construction, but in the light of ordinary usage, as the
common people (whom Lincoln said God must have loved
since He made so many of them) probably understood it
-when they voted to adopt it as part of their charter., (2)
The language used in either a constitution or a statute is
to be construed so as to give full effect to the purpose which
I Monongahela Nav. Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 101, 114 (1843); Cronise v.
Cronise, 54 Pa. 255 (1867); Corn. v. Bell, 145 Pa. 374, 390 (i891); Keller v.
Scranton, 200 Pa. 130 (i9oi); Corn. ex rel. Lafean v. Snyder, 261 Pa. 57 (1918).
(I)
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the people or the legislature had in view when they voted
for it; i. e., by considering the old law, the mischief which
arose under it, and the remedy sought to be applied in order
to correct that mischief. Hence it has been said, (and this
is particularly relevant to our present inquiry): "Residence
is often used to express different meanings according to the
subject matter. * * * In ascertaining the meaning
[thereof] * * * the legislative purpose as well as the
context must be kept in view."2 (3) The language in a
constitution, a statute or an opinion, must be construed
according to the maxim verba generalia restringuntur ad
habilitatem rei vel personam. Chief Justice Marshall well
expressed this, so far as relates to opinions, when he said
in Cohens v. Virginia:3 "It is a maxim not to be disregarded,
that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken
in connection with the case in which those expressions are
used. If they go, beyond the case, they may be respected,
but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit
when the very point is presented for decision. The reason
of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the,
court is investigated with care and considered in its full
extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it
are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their
possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely
investigated."
As the profession, commissions and courts, by neglect of
the foregoing principles, have hesitated regarding the ques-
tion now under consideration, and have frequently evaded
answering it, the elector, whose interests may seem to invite
him to select a given place for his voting residence, can
hardly be blamed for imagining he has the right so to do,
though he, and every one else, knows that an entirely differ-
ent place is his home. As will be shown, however, his real
home is his only voting residence, under Article VIII, Section I
of the present consitution; which, being a growth from and
2 Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64, 68-9 (1914); Hunter V. Bremer,
256 Pa. 257, 263 (1917).
3 6 Wheat. 264, 399-4oo (1821).
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an expansion of provisions in prior Pennsylvania constitu-
tions, must have its genesis stated historically, in order to
comply with the second of the foregoing principles; a more
detailed study being unnecessary because of its full con-
sideration in Fry's Election Case.
4
The constitution of 1776 says in Section 6, that "every
freeman of the full age of twenty-one years, having resided
in this State for the space of one whole year next before
the day of election for representatives, * * * shall enjoy
the right of an elector." That of 1790 says in Article III,
Section i, that "every freeman of the age of twenty-one
years, having resided in the State two years next before the
election * * * shall enjoy the rights of an elector."
That of 1838 says in Article III, Section i, that "every
white freeman of the age of twenty-one years having re-
sided in this State one year, and in the election district
where he offers to vote ten days immediately preceding such
election * * * shall enjoy the rights of an elector. But
a citizen of the United States, who had previously been a
qualified voter of this State and removed therefrom and
returned, and who shall have resided in the election dis-
trict * * * as aforesaid, shall be entitled to vote after
residing in the State six months * * * ." In none of
the foregoing constitutions is the word "resided" defined
or explained, save in so far as it is used antithetically to
"removed" in the last quoted section; though "reside,"
"resided," "residing" or "residence" are also used in Sec-
tions 7 and 42 of the constitution of 1776; in Article I, Sec-
tion 3 of the constitution of. 1790; and in Article V, Sec-
tion 2 of the constitution of 1838.
The present constitution, in Article VIII, Section I, says
that, subject to certain restrictions not bearing upon the
present inquiry, every male citizen "shall be entitled to vote
at all elections" who "shall have resided in the State one
year (or, having previously been a qualified elector or native-
born citizen of the State, shall have removed therefrom and
' Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302 (1872).
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returned, then six months) immediately preceding the elec-
tion" and "shall have resided in the election district where
he shall offer to vote at least two months immediately pre-
ceding the election." Article VIII, Section 13, provides:
"For the purpose of voting no person shall be deemed to
have gained a residence by reason of his presence, or lost
it by reason of his absence, while employed in the service,
either civil or military, of this State or of the United States,
nor while engaged in the navigation of the waters of the
State or of the United States, or on the high seas, nor while
a student of any institution of learning, nor while kept in
any poorhouse or other asylum at public expense, nor while
confined in a public prison." The only other places where
"reside" or any of its derivatives are used, are Article II,
Section 5; Article V, Sections ii and I9; and Article VIII,
Section 16, which relate to the qualifications of senators,
representatives, justices of the peace, aldermen, judges, and
overseers of election, and require, of course, actual residence
within the districts for which those officials were elected or
appointed, as distinguished from the constructive or legal
residence which may be sufficient for the technical law of
domicil. 5 While this is not conclusive of the meaning of
"resided" in Article VIII, Section i, it furnishes a cogent
argument that actual residence is intended thereby,
The question under consideration divides itself into two
others, viz: (i) What does the word "resided" mean in
the foregoing constitutional provisions?; and (2) Under what
circumstances may an elector choose which of two or more
places shall be his voting residence? These questions natur-
ally and inevitably run into one another, rendering it diffi-
cult to consider one without, in a large degree, considering
the other; but an endeavor will be made herein to answer
them separately, as far as it is possible so to do.
As the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
applicable to the constitution, and has been expressly ap-
' Mechem's Public Offices and Officers, sections 437-439; Fry's Election
Case, supra, p. 307.
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plied to this part thereof, 6 it follows that, save in the excepted
cases, a voter must have his actual residence in a particular
election division of the State, in order to qualify him to
vote there; and no expedient or excuse will avail him if he
has not. Since the constitution contains nothing antag-
onistic to this conclusion, it alone should solve the ques-
tion in issue.
Under this maxim also, the same result is reached from
the use of the words "removed therefrom and returned six
months," for this proviso is unnecessary if the elector may
retain his voting residence despite actual removal. More-
over, "returned," as there used, necessarily means actual
return, for a domicil of choice may be gained, or a domicil
of origin be restored, eo instanti; and hence, a "six months"
return can only mean an actual return and residence in
the Commonwealth during the period stated, after the
right to there vote has been lost by removal.
It is obvious, therefore, that even a technical con-
struction of the constitutional provisions compel the con-
clusion that, save in the excepted cases, the voter must have
an actual, fixed residence, in fact, in the place where he
offers to vote; and that no other character of occupancy
will suffice. Moreover, under the first of the foregoing
principles of interpretation, the constitution is not to be
technically construed, but as the average voter probably
understood it. Every such man would unhesitatingly say
that, in order to "have resided in the election district where
he shall offer to vote at least two months immediately pre-
ceding the election," the voter must have actually lived there;
it must have been his home, as we know and love that term;
not an imaginary or technical home, but an actual, estab-
lished one; one which every unbiased citizen and neighbor
would unhesitatingly say is the voter's home. To the
every-day man the word "immediately," as therein used,
excludes the possibility of any other conclusion. This alone
should also determine the point under consideration.
6 Page r. Allen, 58 Pa. 338 (1868).
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Fry's Election Case, herein repeatedly referred to, is
the leading case in Pennsylvania upon the question as to
whether or not students temporarily living in college, solely
for the purpose of pursuing their studies, are entitled to
vote in the election district in which the college is situated,
if they have complied with the other constitutional require-
ments in regard to suffrage. It was held they were not,
for the reason that the word "resided" refers to a real home,
and not to a mere temporary stopping place; and this is sub-
stantially the unanimous American view. 7 Maryland is an
exception to this rule, for there, under prescribed consti-
tutional limitations, one actually removing from one elec-
tion district to another, may vote in the former until, by
lapse of time, he has acquired a right to vote in the latter.8
When, however, Fry's Election Case says (page 307):
"The elector must, therefore, vote at home, not only in the
State, but in the district where his home is. His domicil
must be there," and then defines and illustrates the latter
term; it will be found upon examination, that although the
first part of the quotation is a correct statement of the law,
the inference drawn from the balance thereof and from the
rest of the opinion, viz., that one may always vote at the
place of his domicil, is incorrect, the definition is inaccurate
and the illustrations are deceptive. Thus, (page 309) it
quotes from Judge Story's Conflict of Laws, Section 41, as
follows: "Two things must concur to constitute domicil-
first, residence; and secondly, the intention of making it
the home of the party. There must be found the fact and
the intent"; and from Judge Rush:9 "It may be defined
to be a residence at a particular place, accompanied with
positive or presumptive proof of continuing it an unlimited
time." Most authors, compilers and courts have accepted
this definition as accurate, and have only fought over the
question as to whether or not the law of domicil requires
that the party must intend to make the place his permanent
7 Jacobs on the Law of Domicil, sec. 325.
8 Howard v. Skinner, 87 Md. 556 (1898).
'Note in i Binney 351.
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residence, or only to reside there for an indefinite period.
Yet the original statement and each variation of it, is in-
exact and misleading, because, among other reasons, it
asserts that without residence there can be no domicil;
which is only true as to a domicil of choice newly acquired,
and not to domicil generally. This is so either under the
English rule, which holds that a domicil of origin is at once
restored when one of choice is abandoned, and continues
until another is acquired animo manendi;o or under the
American rule, which maintains there is no such restora-
tion, but that the abandoned domicil, whether or origin
or choice, will continue as such until a new one is so acquired,
with the single exception that the domicil of origin is at
once restored when the citizen starts to return to it." Under
either rule one may be domiciled at a place where he has
never resided and never expects to reside; as for instance
the child of an emigrant born before his parents have ac-
tually acquired a new home; or the child of an explorer,
gypsy or vagabond, when parent and child alike never have
had or intended to have a true home at any time. "A
man need not be a resident anywhere. He must have a
domicil. He cannot abandon, surrender or lose his domicil
until another is acquired. A cosmopolite, or a wanderer
up and down the earth, has no residence, though he must
have a ddmicil."12
The other illustrative cases quoted in Fry's Election
Case only serve to increase the difficulty, and render uncer-
tain what was intended to be decided. Thus it is said
(page 3o9), in quoting from the Case of James Casey,13
that "Removal out of the State, without an intention per-
manently to reside elsewhere, will not lose residence," un-
less a new home is actually acquired and occupied as such;
a conclusion accurate enough so far as relates to the insol-
vent laws there being considered, but wholly inapplicable
10 Udny v. Udny, 7 Session Cases, 3rd Series 89 (1869).
1 Jacobs on the Law of Domicil, secs. 113-1I9.
32 Borland v. Boston, 132 Mass. 89, 95 (1882).
11 i Ashmead 126 (1827).
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to the constitutional provision as to voting, for in the latter
a loss of residence alone carries with it the loss of suffrage.
And again (page 3Io), in quoting from White v. Brown,u
"A man cannot be considered a vagabond or person without
any domicil, for the domicil of origin is not abandoned until
a new one has been intentionally and actually acquired";
a conclusion accurate enough in regard to the succession
of title to a decedent's property then being considered, but
wholly inapplicable to the constitutional provision as to
voting, for, as already shown, the vagabond or person with-
out a home cannot vote, though he must have a domicil.
Fry's Election Case further says (page 309) that the
word "residence," as used in the constitution, "means that
place where the elector makes his permanent or true home,
his principal place of business, and his family residence,
if he have one; where he intends to remain indefinitely, and
without a present intention to depart; when he leaves it he
intends to return to it, and after he returns he deems him-
self at home." This also is in part unfortunately expressed;
for the residence required has no real connection with the
"principal place of business"; nor is the intention to "re-
main indefinitely" a necessary factor, despite its use in
this connection in many text-books and authorities. A
man's residence is where he actually lives, no matter where
his "principal place of business" may be; and it is still his
home, though he has definitely determined to remove there-
from at a fixed date in the future. He must have actually
removed before his residence is lost. 5
For instance, I apprehend that if a citizen of the United
States, formerly living in another State, abandons his resi-
dence there and moves into a house in Pennsylvania, which
thereafter is his only home, and is occupied as such during
the year prescribed by the constitution, he would be entitled
to vote here, though he always intended to move away at
some time in the future. Having given up his old home,
14 I Wall. Jr. 217 (x848).
15 Pfoutz v. Comford, 36 Pa. 420, 422 (86o); Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa.
466 (1877).
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there is no place to which the animus revertendi could apply;
and the intention to move away from the new home at
some time thereafter is at most a floating intention,16 which
may float out of sight when the beauties of our spring and
fall lead him to feel he cannot improve his condition by
going elsewhere, but may reappear with the chills of winter
and the heat of summer.
"The intention [to return], the animus revertendi, must
be a present fixed and continuous intention . . . . It
is not a mere feeling or sentiment, a desire, the yearning
of the untravelled heath, some ultimate purpose not having
a present fixed object. It must not be a remote and secret
intention over which the present intention of residence at
the new place dominates . . . . Again, in considering
the question of intention, it is always important to con-
sider whether the party has anything to return to
If he takes his all with him and leaves no home behind him,
then he may be thought more reasonably to carry his home
with him. His places of residence have no fixed purpose
and are easily moulded to any views which business, profit
or pleasure may suggest. The intention where to reside
may fluctuate from day to day."17
If the conclusion thus reached is not correct, then an
intention to remove at some period, no matter how distant
or uncertain, would exclude the right of suffrage, though
the constitution does not so specify, but, on the contrary,
says that those "possessing the qualifications [actually stated
and not including thisi shall be entitled to vote at all elec-
tions." This would not be construing the language used,
but would be adding a condition, which even the legislature
cannot do,18 and, of course, the courts cannot; a condition
in direct violation of the constitutional provision; one which
the common people, who voted for the constitution, could
not suppose was intended, and which is not necessary to
16 Gilbert v. David, 235 U. S. 561 (1915); 19 Corpus Juris 407.
'7 Barton v. Irasburg, 33 Vt. i59, 162 (i86o).
1 Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. 338 (x868); McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. io9
(1868); Bredin's Appeal, io9 Pa. 337 (1885); 1.5 Cyc. 286; 9 Ruling Case Law
1024.
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accomplish the purpose for which the time limits as to state
and district residence were inserted. Since an abandon-
ment of residence in one place and living in another does
not necessarily effect a change of domicil, judges might
differ on the question as to whether or not the facts above
assumed would result in such a change; but no one could
reasonably doubt that a new residence had been acquired
in Pennsylvania and continued during the period fixed by
the constitution, and from these facts the right of suffrage,
which depends on residence and not on domicil, necessarily
follows.
The same conclusion is reached when we consider what
is the remedy intended by this clause of Article VIII, Sec-
tion i. As already pointed out, the word "residence is
often used to express different meanings according to the
subject matter"; and hence even if, commonly speaking,
it was said that in the constitution it was equivalent to
"domicil," not only would the general expressions on this
subject, found in Fry's Election Case, have to be limited
under the third of the foregoing rules of interpretation, but
we would also have to ascertain the purpose intended to
be accomplished by the constitution, in order to determine
its true meaning.
It is, of course, necessary to decide where a man's
domicil was at the time of his death, in order that his prop-
erty may be administered and distributed according to the
law of that place; for otherwise the varying statutes in the
different jurisdictions might leave the whole subject in con-
fusion; would tend to prevent the free transfer of movable
property from one sovereignty to another, lest the title
thereto, which was good where it came from, should be held
bad in the place to which it is taken, and lest also the pos-
sessor thereof be held liable in the courts of the latter for
keeping property which was his under the laws of the for-
mer. So, too, the technical law of domicil must be applied
in matters arising under the poor, the tax, and the militia
laws, for otherwise the citizen might escape many of his
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public duties, and shift to others his share of the public
burdens.
On the other hand, (cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa
lex), it is wholly inapplicable in cases arising under the
attachment laws,' 9 for thereby the purpose is to secure the
payment of a debt, by giving the creditor a right to attach
property at its situs, if the owner is actually a non-resident
and cannot be there served with process; and hence has
nothing to do with the question of his domicil. Under the
same maxim it is even more inapplicable to a voting resi-
dence, the reason of the constitutional provision being, as
expressed in Chase v. Miller,20 "to secure purity of elec-
tions, it (the Commonwealth) would have its voters in the
place where they are best known on election day"; or, as
stated in Fry's Election Case itself (page 3o8), "not only to
identify the elector, but to prevent frauds in elections,"
which would be easily consummated if the "vagabond or
person without any domicil," who exists in considerable
numbers in every large city, were allowed to vote without
showing he has (page 306) "an actual, fixed residence and
home at the place he offers his ballot," which "was the
evident purpose of the district residence" prescribed by
the constitution. Under the second of the above stated
rules of interpretation, the purpose thus plainly expressed
must be carried into effect, and not weakened or destroyed
by construction; and hence herefrom also the question under
consideration is fully answered, though a few cases from
outside sources may strengthen the conclusion.
"It is sometimes laid down as a general proposition
that, in case of a removal by a person from one place to
another, his first residence is not lost until the second is
acquired. And this is true for some purposes, but not for
the purpose of determining the right of such person to vote.
That right ends in the place removed from, as soon as the
voter completes his removal. It is acquired in the place
I' Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64 (1914); Hunter v. Bremer, 256 Pa.
257 (1917).
20 41 Pa. 403, 427 (1862).
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removed to, only after such a residence therein as the law
requires."21
"For the purpose of voting, a domicil once gained
does not continue until a new one is acquired, nor does a
right to vote at a particular poll or district continue until
the right to vote elsewhere is shown."22
"In other words, the mere intent without the fact of
residence or abiding, cannot constitute the domicil. Neither
can the intent, without having the abode, the home, the
place to dwell, constitute the residence. Residence, as there
used, we think has reference to the fact that the citizen or
person has a place that, to use an expressive word, is called
'home,' with no present intention of removing therefrom.
* * * But bodily presence ordinarily is essential in
effecting a domicil in the initiative. One might intend to
dwell in a place as his permanent abode, and yet never
see it. So he might dwell there without thought of remain-
ing. In neither event would he be a resident within the
meaning of the election laws."23
"It does not follow because a man must have a domicil
somewhere, and that a domicil once gained remains until
a new one is acquired, that a man must be entitled to vote
somewhere, or that the right to vote at a particular poll,
being once established, is presumed to continue until the
right to vote elsewhere is shown. Permanent residence is
but one of the requisites of the right to vote, and it must,
in this State, always precede the election by an extended
space of time * * *. But abandonment of a residence
is instantaneous, and if it be, by a voter, of a residence in
one voting district, at a date too near the election for the
requisite intervening time of residence to be a voter in an-
other voting district to which he has removed, the voter
will be entitled to vote in neither voting district * * *
If a party were to remove his family to a particular district,
SMcCrary on Elections 75, citing Thompson v. Ewing, i Brewster io3
(1861), to which might have been added Fry's Election Case, supra, p. 307-
229 Ruling Case Law, IO3i.
'2 State of Iowa v. Savre, 129 Iowa 122, 125 (1905).
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there build and furnish them a home, keep his property
there, return there constantly, as leisure allowed, and re-
main there with his family during sickness and unemployed
time, this would constitute his residence, notwithstanding
he might be employed in labor in another district, and
claim that to be his residence * * * for, on questions
of domicil, less weight is given to the party's declaration
than to his acts * * * his subsequently testifying that
he had never intended to permanently abandon his resi-
dence here, but had all the time intended at some future
time to return, could not control.
' ' 24
From what has been said it is clear that if Fry's Elec-
tion Case was so construed as to always allow a man to vote
where he is domiciled, even though he did not actually
reside there, it would permit the very thing the constitu-
tional provision aimed to destroy, viz., a non-resident voting
class. In Sieur Garengeau's Case25 it was shown that for
sixty-four years he had resided at places which were not
his legal domicil; and in Mr. Aspeen's Case26 that he had
so resided elsewhere for forty-eight years. Under such cir-
cumstances it would be intolerable to allow a man to vote
at the place where he is domiciled; and shorter periods of
absence would only result in a difference in the degree and
not in the kind of difficulty experienced. It could never
be certainly known who were the actual voters; and an
election might well be made to turn on the vote of tramps
and vagrants, who never had a real home, who have no
interest in the community where they seek to vote, but
who have never lost their domicil of origin because they
never had or even intended to have a permanent residence
anywhere.
It is, therefore, altogether free from doubt that the
constitutional provision and the technical law of domicil
are, to the extent stated, at variance regarding the subject
24 Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, i25 Il. .41, 194-196 (i888).
25 2 Denisart's Collection de Decisions Nouvelles, etc. (9 me Edit) 130,
P]. 33
.2 White v. Brown, i Xall. Jr. 217 (1848).
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under consideration, notwithstanding the following quota-
tion from Fry's Election Case (pages 3io-ii): "These
principles enable us to dispose of the first of the two classes
into which the case stated divides these students, viz.:
'Those who support themselves, or are assisted pecunarily
by persons other than their parents, are emancipated from
their father's families; have left the home of their parents
and never intend to return and make it a permanent abode.'
Having, as the case states, come to Allentown for no other
purpose than to receive a collegiate education, and intending
to leave after graduating, they have not lost their home
domicil, and could vote there on returning to it, though they
should not reenter their father's house. Emancipation from
their father's family and independent support, and the
leaving of the home belonging to their parents, have not
forfeited their own domicil. Their father's house is not
necessarily their home, but the place is where it is. Though
not in the bosom of that family, the place of their residence
is not lost to them until they have voluntarily changed it
and found a new home. Upon the terms of the stated
case, it cannot be said they have abandoned their original
home, and actually obtained another."
If this language was limited to the only point raised
by the case stated, it might now be dismissed as a moot
question, for the constitution of 1873 preserves to every
"student of any institution of learning," the right to vote
in the election district of his old home, even though that
home was finally abandoned when he went to pursue his
studies. Inasmuch, however, as Fry's Election Case was
decided under the constitution of 1838, which did not con-
tain this exception, and as the language is broad enough
to cover all cases of removal where a new domicil has not
yet been acquired, two things may be added, by way of
supplement, to the conclusive'answer thereto already made:
(i) The statement quoted is a wholly unnecessary obiter
dictum, for the only question the court had to decide was
whether or not the students could vote in the election dis-
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-trict in which the college was situated, and not whether
they could vote elsewhere. (2) While no other conclusion
-could be reached, if, under the constitution of 1838 then in
force, the word "residence" meant "domicil" in its full,
technical sense, it was illogical and unreasonable under
-the present constitutional provisions, which say nothing on
-the subject of domicil, but require actual residence a speci-
fied number of days "immediately preceding such election."
If the dictum quoted was sustained, then the "wanderer
up and down the earth" would be entitled to vote in an
-election district where he never has "resided" and where
he is wholly unknown, in direct violation of the express
-language of the constitution, and also of the purpose of its
requirement as to residence.
It is repeated, therefore, as a matter of law, that, sub-
ject to the exceptions specified in the constitution, the
'residence prescribed by it must be an actual residence in
the physical occupancy of the voter, his real home in fact
-and not in expression merely; and this brings us to the sec-
ond question, viz.: Under what circumstances may an
elector choose which of two or more places shall be his voting
residence?, a question which might have been but was not
raised in Fry's Election Case.
When the constitution of 1838 said that "every white
freeman of the age of twenty-one years, having resided in
-this State one year, and in the election district where he
,offers to vote ten days immediately preceding such elec-
tion * * * shall enjoy the rights of an elector," it is
evident, as Fry's Election Case points out, that "the state
residence and the district residence are of the same nature,
.and whatever is necessary to constitute the one is essential
to define the other, the only difference being in their time
,of duration." As the constitution of 1873 contains the
same language, an identical conclusion must be reached
-thereunder. It follows that if a voter may elect to treat a
,particular place in Philadelphia or Allegheny County as
his voting residence, though in fact he resides in some other
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county, he may so elect though he resides in California or
Florida. This reductio ad absurdam would make the con-
stitutional provision as to residence a dead letter. More-
over such reasoning would result also in Article VIII, Sec-
tion 13 becoming a wholly useless provision, for its purpose
would be fully accomplished by those removing from the
State electing to continue their old home here as their voting
residence.
Notwithstanding the conclusive effect of the foregoing
considerations, it seems to be supposed by some that an
elector may determine where he shall vote, by simply assert-
ing a stated place is his residence, though his real home
is elsewhere; and by others, if, when changing his residence,
he alleges he still lives at the old home, it will continue to
be his voting residence, though thereafter his family never
occupies it, and when he does it is for a temporary purpose
only, intending, when this has been accomplished, to return
to the new home, which his family and everybody else
recognizes is his real home, and he does also for every other
purpose than that of voting. What has been said above-
conclusively shows the constitution negatives both of these
claims. A choice of that which does not in fact comply
with the conditions precedent to the exercise of a right or
privilege, in the nature of things will be wholly inefficacious;
and hence a voter cannot select one of two or more places
as his voting residence, unless it is his real home. It is
only when he has more than one real home that a right of
selection exists, as in the familiar instance of a country
home for the summer and a city home for the winter, at
each of which he and his family, if he has one, actually
lives during a portion of the year, and to the one-chosen
as his domicil and voting residence he intends to return
as soon as, by the lapse of time, the temporary purpose
for which he went to the other has ended.
While it is doubtless true, as stated by Lord Cran-
worth in Whicker v. Hume,27 "By domicil we mean home,
27 7 H. L. Cases, 124, 16o (1858).
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the permanent home; and if you do not understand your
permanent home, I am afraid that no illustration drawn
from foreign writers or foreign languages, will very much
help you to it"; a few illustrations drawn from the English
language and from Pennsylvania decisions, may give point
to the conclusions already stated in regard to the elector's
right of choice. For instance, if a man has'a real summer
home in Maine and a real winter one in Pennsylvania, he
may select which of the two shall be his domicil and voting
residence. But if the place in Maine is intended to be and
in fact is occupied by him, either alone or with some one
or all of his family, only for shooting or fishing, and is de-
serted when the season therefor closes, or when they get
tired of the sport, he cannot select it as his domicil or voting
residence, for it is not his real home. So also, if, as in Win-
sor's Estate,2S he has two real homes, occupied at different
seasons of the year, one of which has been treated by him
as his domicil and voting residence, he may change to the
other eo instanti by a statement to that effect, if his future
acts accord with the declaration. On the other hand, as
in Blessing's Estate,29 if one moves with his family from
a residence, no matter how long established, to another,
which latter he and they occupy as a home, though the
old house has never been entirely closed, but has been used
by him, during the day-time, for resting and eating, and
he has frequently spoken and written of it as his home,
these facts alone will not suffice to enable him to select
it as his domicil or voting residence, for it is not his real
home.
The rule stated in this latter case, namely. that the
party's acts must accord with the choice he makes, applies
even where there are two homes occupied at different seasons
of the year; and a fortiori it does so where one thereof is but
a perfunctory stopping place. In all such cases the state-
ment that the voter has selected a certain place as his home,
2 264 Pa. 552 (1919).
2 267 Pa., 38o (1920).
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must necessarily give way to proof of his acts; for one can--
not be heard to so say, if in fact his actions show that some.
other place is his real home. "That actions speak louder-
than words is sound law as well as proverbial wisdom."3o0
This principle, drawn from the highest known source, is.
so clear and so necessarily true, that but a few additional
opinions will be quoted to show that it is of substantially-
universal application in the present matter.
"A person's wish to retain a domicil in one country
will not enable him to retain it, if, in fact, he resides with
the animus manendi in another." 31
"The declarations of the person whose domicil is sought
to be fixed are certainly not conclusive upon the question
of intention; but with respect to the weight which is to be
given to them it is difficult to lay down any rule. Acts
are regarded as more important than declarations. * * *
If they (the declarations) are not inconsistent with acts,
and are faithfully reported, they often serve to turn the
scale; but it is otherwise if they are contradicted by the
acts and general conduct of the person making them."
32
"It is always a question of fact where the place of a
man's domicil is. As to most persons it is determined at
once by the decisive facts which show permanent and un-
changing residence in only one place. As to such persons,
the question of domicil, that is, the question where they are-
to be taxed, or where they have a right to vote, presents.
no difficulty. There can be no right of election to the tax-
payer between two places, when one is already fixed by
the facts which go to establish domicil. It is only when.
the facts which establish permanent residence and domicil
are ambiguous and uncertain, in the absence of any settled
abode, and when the real intention of the party cannot be-
ascertained, that the question becomes difficult. It may-
then require an examination into the motives of the man,
his habits and character, his domestic, social, political and
30 Graham v. Dempsey, 169 Pa. 460, 462 (1895).
31 Dicey's Conflict of Laws i16.
2Jacobs on the Law of Domicil, sec. 455.
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business relations for a series of years; and the answer will
depend in the end upon the weight of evidence in favor
of one of two or more places * * *. The place of domi-
cil, upon which so many important municipal obligations
and privileges depend, is not left by the law to the choice
of the citizen, except only as such choice may give char-
acter to existing relations and accompanying acts of resi-
dence which are not in conflict with it."'33
These quotations might be multiplied, but in an en-
deavor (a vain one, perhaps, as witness Judge Bregy's at-
tempt in Comm. v. Devine, 34) to make the answer to
the question under consideration clear beyond cavil, this
paper has already exceeded its intended limits. Suffice it
to say, therefore, it is believed there are no authorities,
worthy of the name, to the contrary thereof; and hence it
need only be said as a resum6:
i. Subject to the exceptions specified in the constitu-
tion, an elector's voting residence is his actual, established
home.
2. If he is a family man, the actual, established home
is ordinarily where the family actually lives; if not it is
where he normally and usually resides; and no temporary
use of any other house, whether or not he formerly lived
there, will justify a choice by him, or avail as against the
actual, established home.
3. If he has two or more actual, established homes, he
may select which of them shall be his voting residence;
but not otherwise.
4. He cannot legally vote elsewhere than in the elec-
tion district in which is situated his actual, established
home, as hereinbefore defined.
Alex. Simpson, Jr.
Of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
"Thayer v. Boston, 124 Mass. 132, 144-146 (1878).
1' 54 D. R. I (Pa., 19o5).
